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Abstract
We examine the optimal design of public policies directed at controlling the consumption of
tobacco. The public authority uses two types of instruments: an excise tax, that hinders
consumption by increasing the price of cigarettes, and (ii) prevention and control programs,
that reduce smoking by increasing consumersawareness about future health harm. On the
normative side, the analysis focuses on the optimal mix between the two types of instruments
when the objective of the policy maker is to maximize social welfare. On the positive side,
the paper investigates how the lobbying activities of the tobacco industry and of anti-tobacco
organizations may distort government intervention.
Keywords: Harmful consumption, Pigouvian taxation, Lobbying, Common agency games,
Excise taxation in oligopoly
JEL Codes: D72, H21, H23, I18
1 Introduction
We examine the optimal design of public policies directed at controlling the consump-
tion of a harmful good, like tobacco or alcoholic drinks, and we investigate how the
lobbying activities of interested parties may distort government intervention.
In our framework, a public authority can use two types of policy instruments to
a¤ect the consumption of the harmful good: (i) an excise tax that discourages consump-
tion by increasing the price of the good, and (ii) prevention and control programs that
1Corresponding author. Università dellInsubria, Via S.Abbondio 9, 22100 Como, Italy. E-
mail: umberto.galmarini@uninsubria.it
1
lower consumption by making individuals more aware about future health harm. First,
we study the optimal mix between the two types of instruments, in the benchmark case
in which the objective of the policy maker is to maximize social welfare.
We then investigate the implications of the possibility of lobbying directed at in-
uencing public policy, by allowing for two pressure groups characterized by opposed
interests. On the one hand, the producers of the harmful good lobby to obtain weaker
control policies. On the other hand, consumers (organized, e.g., in associations of cit-
izens) lobby to advocate stricter regulation of harmful consumption. We thus examine
under which conditions one group may prevail over the other one in inuencing policy,
and we then evaluate the welfare losses (if any) induced by lobbying activity.
We focus our attention on the case of tobacco consumption, by adopting a frame-
work closely related to that developed by ODonoghue and Rabin (2006) to examine the
optimal excise taxation of a harmful good. However, we extend their model along sev-
eral dimensions. First, we introduce an additional instrument that the regulator may
employ to control consumption, namely all forms of prevention and control programs
that may help consumers to act more rationallyby making them more aware about
the future harm from current consumption. Second, we assume that cigarettes are
traded in an oligopolistic market, instead of a perfectly competitive market, therefore
adding ine¢ ciencies due to the presence of market power. Finally, we extend the norm-
ative analysis in ODonoghue and Rabin (2006) by explicitly adding political-economy
considerations in the form of lobbying by special interest groups.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in Section 2,
where we derive the market equilibrium and the individual and aggregate welfare. The
socially optimal levels of taxation and of prevention and control policies are derived in
Section 3, while lobbying is introduced in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper and
discusses avenues for future research.
2 The model
2.1 Consumersbehavior and market equilibrium
We build on the model by ODonoghue and Rabin (2006). Consider an individual that
consumes a harmful good, for instance tobacco, and another standardconsumption
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good. The utility function is given by2
u(x; z) 

  x
2

x  ()x+ z,  = b+ k (1)
where x is the consumption of the harmful good and z is the consumption of the other
consumption goods (quasi-linearity of the utility implies that all income e¤ects fall on
the demand for z). The rst term of the utility function represents the immediate
pleasure from consumption; the parameter   0 captures the intensity of preferences
for good x. The second term represents the perceived present value of future harm that
the consumer will su¤er from todays consumption; we consider a linear form3 in which
the perceived harm per unit of consumption is equal to . The parameter   0
represents the true harm, whereas the term  2 [0; 1] captures (in a reduced form) time
inconsistency, or bounded rationality, in consumer behavior; in fact,  < 1 implies
overconsumption with respect to the e¢ cient level of consumption (whereas  = 1
implies rational behavior). ODonoghue and Rabin (2006) provide a full intertemporal
derivation of this model, while Gruber and K½oszegi (2004) present a more articulated
model in which the current level of health harm depends on the entire pattern of past
consumption levels.
In ODonoghue and Rabin (2006) the parameter  capturing the degree of time
inconsistency is exogenous. We extend their model by assuming that  is endogenously
determined by the variable , that represents a policy instrument that the regulator can
use to a¤ect the consumption of the harmful good. For instance, when the government
launches an awareness campaign to inform citizens about the harm from smoking,
consumers become more conscious of future harms and thus the time inconsistency
problem becomes less serious, because  increases. The parameter b  1 represents the
exogenous part of time inconsistency (i.e., the component of  that is independent of
), whereas k > 0 is a technical parameter representing the productivityof policy 
on self consciousness.
The population of consumers is therefore characterized by the triplet (; ; b) of
individualsattributes. For now, we assume that b is single-valued and that the distri-
bution of types is F (; );4 the mass of consumers is also normalized to unity.
2ODonoghue and Rabin (2006) start their analysis with a general utility function and then consider
a specic functional form to make numerical simulations on tax incidence and optimal taxation. Instead,
we directly start with a specic functional form of the utility function.
3A quadratic form, with a linearly increasing marginal harm, represents an alternative to the adopted
specication.
4We plan to consider the more general case of heterogenous agents with respect to b. Following
3
The consumers budget constraint is
z  I + `  px, (2)
where I is the exogenous income and ` is a lump sum transfer from the government,
equal for all consumers (see below). Good z is produced in a competitive market and its
price is normalized to unity. Good x is instead produced in an oligopolistic market and p
is the consumersprice. By considering an oligopolistic market for cigarettes, we extend
the current literature on tobacco taxation (e.g., Gruber and K½oszegi, 2004, ODonoghue
and Rabin, 2006), which typically assumes a competitive market, also along another
dimension. In fact, in most countries the market for cigarettes is characterized by the
presence of a small number of big producers.
The rst order condition for maximizing (1) subject to (2) is given by
  x  ()   p = 0,
so that the individual demand for good x is equal to (we drop the arguments , b,  to
simplify notation whenever possible)
x(p; ) =   ()   p. (3)
We assume that x(p; ) > 0 for all types.5 Aggregate demand (that is equal to per
capita demand) is then equal to
X(p; ) =   ()   p,
while the inverse aggregate demand is
p(X; ) =   ()  X. (4)
As for the market of good x, consider a Cournot oligopoly, with a xed number,
m  1, of quantity-setting identical rms.6 There is a specic (excise) tax at rate t on
the consumption of the harmful good, levied on producers. Production costs are linear,
with constant marginal costs normalized to unity (there are no xed costs). Firm j
ODonoghue and Rabin (2006), we then assume the distribution function F (; ; b) = G(; )H(b),
that implies cov(; b) = cov(; b) = 0.
5We assume that (; ; b) are such that all individuals are smokers at all equilibrium prices. Hence
we rule out corner solutions in which consumption is zero for some agents.
6The Cournot quantity-setting oligopoly model is a standard framework for the analysis of the
incidence of indirect taxes under imperfect competition. See Seade (1985) and Stern (1987).
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maximizes its prot function with respect to quantity produced, xj , taking as given
the quantities produced by the other rms:
j = (p(X; )  1  t)xj , where X =
mX
i=1
xi. (5)
By di¤erentiating (5) with respect to xj , the necessary rst order condition for
prot maximization by rm j can be written as:7
  ()   1  t 
X
k 6=j
xk   2xj = 0, j = 1; : : : ;m. (6)
By summing equation (6) over j = 1; : : : ;m, one gets:
m(  ()   1  t)  (m  1)X   2X = 0.
From the latter equation we then obtain the equilibrium aggregate quantity as a func-
tion of the relevant tax rates:
X(t; ) = m(1 +m) 1 (  ()   1  t) . (7)
The market equilibrium is symmetric, since rms are identical. We restrict the analysis
to market equilibria such that t    ()   1, in order to ensure that X(t; ) > 0.8
By substituting X(t; ) into (4) and then solving for p we get the equilibrium
consumersprice:
p(t; ) =
m
1 +m
(1 + t) +
1
1 +m
(  ()) . (8)
Notice that aggregate (per capita) consumption (7) is decreasing in both policy para-
meters t and . However, while the tax rate t increases the consumersprice (the more
so the higher is the number of rms m, so that the more competitive is the market),
anti-tobacco policies  decrease it because they reduce individual, and thus aggregate,
demand.
By substituting p from (8) into (3) we get individual consumption as a function of
the policy parameters and of individual type:
x(t; ) =
m
1 +m
(  ()   1  t) + 1
1 +m
[(  )  ()(   )] . (9)
7Under the given hypotheses (linear demand and linear production costs) the necessary rst order
conditions for prot maximization are also su¢ cient. Moreover, Sterns (1987) stability condition of
the market equilibrium is also satised.
8 In what follows, we will not return to this existence condition since it is immediate to verify that
the equilibrium policies (both in the absence and in the presence of lobbying) are such that X > 0.
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It is then immediate to see that
@x
@t
=  m(1 +m) 1 < 0, (10)
@x
@
=  k + (1 +m) 1k Q 0 i¤  R (1 +m) 1. (11)
These expressions show an interesting result.
Proposition 1 Taxation reduces individual consumption of all types, because it in-
creases the consumers price. Control policies, instead, reduce consumption only for
those types with harm  greater than (1 +m) 1.
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is simple: an increase in  reduces aggregate
demand and therefore the equilibrium price; however, for those with a low  the re-
duction in price causes an increase in demand that outweighs the reduction due to a
higher .
Aggregate equilibrium prots are equal to
(t; ) = [p(t; )  1  t]X(t; ). (12)
2.2 Individual and aggregate welfare
We assume that the revenue from the taxation of tobacco consumption, tX(t; ), net
of the expenditure sustained for direct control policies, (=2)2,   0, is given back
lump sum, and uniformly in per capita terms, to consumers, so that9
`(t; ) = tX(t; )  
2
2. (13)
Using (1) and (2), individual welfare can be dened as
w 

  x

2

x   x   px + ` + I,
where we suppress the arguments t and  from all the starred equilibrium variables
to simplify the notation. Notice that the true harm, x, enters into the denition of
individual welfare, in place of the perceived harm, ()x, that instead enters into the
decision utility function (1).
By using (13) the above expression can be written as
w(t; )  u^+ t(X   x)  (p   1  t)x   
2
2 + I, (14)
9 It is possible to consider a general cost function '(), '0 > 0, '00 > 0. Notice also that we assume
that there are no administrative costs for tax collection.
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where
u^(t; ) 

     1  x
(t; )
2

x(t; ). (15)
Expression (14) shows that individual welfare is composed of several terms. The rst
is u^, which is the true gross consumers surplus net of cigarettes production costs. The
second term shows that individuals with levels of consumption below the average level
(X > x) are subsidized by individuals with an above the average consumption level
(X < x), because for the former the tax paid on consumption is lower than the
lump sum payment received from the government (equal to average tax revenue), while
for the latter individuals the reverse pattern holds true. The third term shows that
individualswelfare is negatively a¤ected by the price-cost mark-up, p 1  t, and the
more so the higher is consumption, x. Finally, citizens welfare is negatively a¤ected
by the cost of the control policy .
Using a Utilitarian social welfare function to aggregate the individual welfare levels
(14), per capita (aggregate) welfare of consumers is equal to:
W (t; ) = EF [w(t; )] = EF [u^(t; )] (t; )  
2
2 + I. (16)
By adding prots, aggregate social welfare (or aggregate surplus) is then equal to:

(t; ) =W (t; ) + (t; ) = EF [u^(t; )]  
2
2 + I. (17)
3 E¢ cient tobacco control policy
Suppose that the policy maker sets the policy instruments with the aim of maximiz-
ing the aggregate surplus (17). This social objective function implies that optimality
is dened in terms of e¢ ciency. Distributional issues (within the group of smokers,
between smokers and non-smokers, between consumers and prot earners) are ignored.
The necessary rst order conditions for a socially optimal policy are:
@

@t
 EF

@u^
@t

= EF

(     1  x) @x

@t

= 0, (18)
@

@
 EF

@u^
@

   = EF

(     1  x) @x

@

   = 0, (19)
where, by di¤erentiating equation (15), we use the fact that
@u^
@t
= (     1  x) @x

@t
, (20)
@u^
@
= (     1  x) @x

@
. (21)
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Using also (10) and (11) equations (18) and (19) become:
@

@t
  m(1 +m) 1 (     1 X) = 0, (22)
@

@
 (1 +m) 1k (     1 X)  kEF [(     1  x) ]   = 0. (23)
It is then immediate to see that the second order su¢ cient conditions for a maximum
are satised:
@2

@t2
  

m
1 +m
2
< 0,
@2

@2
  

m
1 +m
k
2
  k2 var()   < 0,
@2

@t@
  

m
1 +m
2
k < 0,
@2

@t2
@2

@2
 

@2

@t@
2


m
1 +m
2  
k2 var() + 

> 0.
After substituting for X from (7) into (22), the rst order condition for t can be
written as
m
1 +m
(1 + t) =  + 1  1
1 +m
  m
1 +m
(b+ k). (24)
We can therefore state the following result.
Proposition 2 For given , the optimal tax rate is equal to:
t() = (1  b  k)   1
m
(     1). (25)
Equation (25) is composed of two terms of opposite sign. The rst is positive and
it is equal to the average harm that consumers do not internalize because of time
inconsistent behavior; this is the Pigouvian part of the optimal tax rate. The second
term is negative and it corrects for market power, since oligopoly pricing is above
marginal cost. Thus, in theory both a tax and a subsidy could be optimal. However,
in practice we expect the externality to be more important than market imperfection,
so that a positive tax is optimal.
Turning to the control policy , since     1 X = 0 by equation (22), the rst
order condition (23) can be written as:
 EF [(     1  x) ] = 
k
.
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Substituting for x from (9) we then get
  [1  (b+ k)]EF

2
  + 1
1 +m
  1
1 +m
(b+k)()2+
m
1 +m
(1+ t) =

k
.
Using (24), after some manipulations, the latter equation simplies to:
  [1  (b+ k)]EF 2  ()2	 = 
k
.
Given that EF

2
  ()2  var(), we nally get the optimal  and, by substituting
for  into (25), we then obtain the optimal tax rate. The expressions for  and t are
given in the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 The optimal control policy and tax rate in the absence of lobbying are
given by, respectively,
 =
(1  b)k var()
+ k2 var()
, (26)
and
t =
(1  b)
+ k2 var()
  1
m
(     1). (27)
It is immediate to see that   ()  b+ k  1 i¤ b  1, for all k > 0,   0,
as we have assumed above. Observe also that t <      1 so that X > 0.
Notice that market structure, represented by the number of rms m, a¤ects only
the optimal tax rate t and not the optimal level of anti-tobacco control policy  (this
outcome may not hold in general, for it could be due to the functional forms used in the
model; it is however an interesting result). The rst term in (27) is positive and corrects
for the average consumption externality; the second term is negative and corrects for
oligopoly pricing above marginal cost. Since, in the present specication of the model,
the excise tax discourages consumption of all consumer types in an uniform manner
(see the partial derivative 10), then the numerator of the rst term in (27) depends
on the average harm . The control policy , instead, bears a non-uniform impact
on consumption that depends on  (see the partial derivative 11) and therefore the
numerator of (26) depends on the variance of the harm, var(). It is interesting to see
that although raising taxes is costless while dissuading overconsumption is costly, a non-
negative level of both instruments is optimal, provided that var() > 0. In the special
case in which control policies are also costless ( = 0), we have that  = (1   b)=k
and t =  (      1)=m, so that taxation targets market imperfection while control
9
policies target the consumption externality.10 The policy instrument  is always zero
at the optimum when var() = 0 and  > 0, because in this case costless taxation is a
su¢ cient instrument to target both the ine¢ ciency due to market power and that due
to the externality. In other terms, if var() = 0 then  becomes a redundant instrument
even if  = 0, so that only t matters.
4 Lobbying
There are two main groups that are a¤ected by tobacco control policies: producers and
consumers. However, while producers are identical, and thus are uniformly a¤ected by
government policy, consumers are heterogeneous, and therefore each one may hold a
di¤erent view about the desired levels of policy instruments.11 Formally, the payo¤ of
rms is aggregate prots (12); that of citizens in the aggregate is consumerssurplus,
net of the externality, plus tax revenue, minus the cost of control policies; that is the
expression (16).12 Recall that we assumed that tax revenue is rebated to consumers,
and not to rms.
In a lobbying model with truthful contributions by the two special interest groups,13
the policy maker maximizes the objective function:
V (t; ) = 
(t; ) +  [(t; ) + W (t; )] ,
where   0 is a parameter representing how much the policy maker values contribu-
tions relative to aggregate surplus (i.e., the degree of greediness of the policy maker, as
in Persson, 1998), while the parameter  2 [0; 1] is introduced to capture the fact that
citizens are not able (unless  = 1) to coordinate perfectly to maximize their aggregate
surplus, because of the above mentioned heterogeneity of interests within their group,
free riding, inability to devise side payments among their members, and so on.
10An example of a costless (for the government) control policy is the obligation to print warning
messages about harm from smoking on cigarette packets.
11To see this, use (14), and (20)-(21) to compute
@w
@t
and
@w
@
to show who are the types that
support higher t and  and who are those that support less strict policies.
12We assume that prots are concentrated in the hands of a small number of citizens, so that prot
earners and consumers constitute two distinct groups with di¤erent stakes in public policy.
13We use the buying inuencemodel of lobbying with truthful contributions developed by Bernheim
and Whinston (1986a, 1986b), Dixit, Grossman and Helpman (1997), Grossman and Helpman (1994,
2001).
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From the denition of 
(t; ) we can express the objective function V (t; ) as follows:
V (t; ) = (1 + )(t; ) + (1 + )W (t; ) =
= (1  )(t; ) + (1 + )

EF [u^(t; )]  
2
2 + I

=
= (1  )(t; ) + (1 + )
(t; ).
The expression in the last row clearly shows that the policy maker subject to lobbying
maximizes a weighted sum of aggregate surplus 
 (the objective function of a benevolent
policy maker) and aggregate prots . Therefore, it is the extra weight given to prots
that distorts tax policy under lobbying with respect to the optimal policy in the absence
of lobbying.
Since
@
@t
= (p   1  t) @X

@t
+

@p
@t
  1

X =
=  m(1 +m) 1 (p   1  t)  (1 +m) 1X =
=  2m(1 +m) 2 [  (b+ k)   1  t] =  2(1 +m) 1X < 0,
@
@
= (p   1  t) @X

@
+X
@p
@
=
=  (1 +m) 1k [m (p   1  t) +X] =
=  2m(1 +m) 2k [  (b+ k)   1  t] =  2k(1 +m) 1X < 0,
it is clear that lobbying aims at making the tobacco control policy less strict than in
the absence of it.
Let
 =
(1  )
1 + 
.
The rst order condition for maximizing V with respect to t is:
@V
@t
= (1  )@

@t
+ (1 + )
@

@t
= 0,
that can be written as
@

@t
+ 
@
@t
= 0. (28)
The rst order condition for maximizing V with respect to  can be written as:
@

@
+ 
@
@
= 0. (29)
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Since
@
@t
< 0 and
@
@
< 0 one should expect in equilibrium lower levels of both 
and t than in the absence of lobbying. Moreover, we know that
@
@
< 0,
@
@
> 0.
We need therefore to ask whether if  increases, it is always true that both t
and  decrease. Solving (28) and (29) we obtain for  the same expression (26)
obtained in the absence of lobbying.14 Somewhat surprisingly, lobbying has no impact
on the optimal control policy, which can be rationalized as follows. The lobby of
rms is composed of identical members, and rms do not care about the externality
or consumers surplus, but only about prots. The lobby of citizens, instead, cares
about consumerssurplus and the externality. However, the heterogenous preferences
are aggregated linearly and therefore only the average preference parameters matter
in the objective function of the lobby. The variance of attitudes does not matter for
the lobby, which therefore does not distort  that depends on variance. The following
proposition illustrates the e¤ects of lobbying on the equilibrium tax rate.
Proposition 4 Lobbying a¤ects only the equilibrium tax rate that is equal to
t =
(1  b)
+ k2 var()
  1
m
(     1) + 2(1 +m)(     1)
m


2  m

. (30)
The third element accounts for the specic impact of lobbying, since the rst two
terms are already present in the expression (27) for t in the absence of lobbying. If
 = 1 (i.e., consumers are perfectly organized as a lobby group) then  = 0 and the
lobby of producers and the lobby of consumers do not distort policy: they simply
neutralize each other. In general, however,  < 1 and producers are more e¤ective than
consumers as a special interest group. Note that the term

2  m =
(1  )
2(1  )  (1 + )m (31)
can take both negative and positive values. If m ! 1, then prots tend to zero and
producers do not lobby; hence the latter term tends to zero and tax policy is not
distorted, since the objective functions of the policy maker and of citizens coincide for
all .
14The solution is obtained by means of standard algebra in the case of a uniform distribution of
 and with  single-valued. However, we conjecture that the same result holds for any distribution
function.
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The sign of (31) is linked to the second order conditions for a maximum. Considering
for notational convenience
~V =
1
1 + 
V;
and di¤erentiating it without loss of generality instead of V , we obtain
@2 ~V
@t2
   m
(1 +m)2
(m  2) < 0 i¤ 2  m < 0,
@2 ~V
@2
  

m
1 +m
k
2
  k2 var()  + 2m
(1 +m)2
(k)2 < 0,
@2 ~V
@t@
  

m
1 +m
2
k +
2m
(1 +m)2
k < 0,
@2 ~V
@t2
@2 ~V
@2
 
 
@2 ~V
@t@
!2
 m
(1 +m)2
 
k2 var() + 

(m  2) > 0 i¤ 2  m < 0.
Therefore the second order conditions for a maximum require that
2  m < 0,
which means that the third term in (30) is negative, so that, unsurprisingly, lobbying
distorts downward the tax rate when  < 1, because producers are more powerful than
consumers. If, instead, 2  m > 0, we get a corner solution for the optimal tax rate:
t = 0 if the tax rate cannot be negative, t < 0 such that p = 0 if a negative tax rate
is allowed.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper investigates the optimal design of policies controlling the consumption of
tobacco based on the joint use of two instruments: an excise tax, limiting consumption
by inducing an increase in the price of cigarettes, and prevention and control programs,
reducing the consumption of cigarettes by increasing consumersawareness about future
health harm.
We nd that both policy instruments are a¤ected by the degree of time inconsist-
ency, but they have di¤erent e¤ects: the tax rate reduces consumption of all agents
proportionally to the average harm, while the control policy depends on the variance
of the harm. Interestingly, although raising taxes is costless while control policies are
costly, a non-negative level of both instruments is optimal. This follows from the fact
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that market structure inuences only the optimal tax rate, but it bears no impact on
the optimal level of the control policy. In the special case in which also control policies
are costless taxation targets market imperfection while control policies target the con-
sumption externality. Control policies become irrelevant only when the variance of the
harm is zero, in which case costless taxation is su¢ cient to target both the ine¢ ciency
due to market power and that due to the externality.
Our analysis of lobbying is quite rened in the sense that it fully accounts for con-
sumers heterogeneity about the desired level of policy instruments. However, it is
somewhat unsatisfactory in another respect, as it neglects that consumers may divide
into groups along other relevant dimensions. A partitioning that may have important
implications for lobbying is that between smokers and non-smokers. Once one looks
at a population as composed by two groups, smokers and non-smokers, it seems reas-
onable to assume that non smokers do not care about the impact of control policies
on consumerssurplus and on the externality. Non-smokers are instead happy to cash
the revenue from taxing tobacco consumption: in fact, revenue accrues uniformly to
both smokers and non-smokers. Hence non smokers may have tax revenue as their
objective function. In reality, non-smokers may also care for the externality, or harm,
if they feel worried for smokers; but at least on rst approximation one may want to
dispose of altruistic behavior. Based on the arguments above, a more rened model
of lobbying may arise, in which also non smokers lobby (although free riding is likely
to cause incomplete participation to the lobbying activity), having obviously interests
sharply contrasting with those of rms. Extending our analysis in this direction is an
important goal for future research.
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